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Raymond Hubbard documents the statistical, social, and philosophical causes of the
“reproducibility crisis” in Corrupt Research: The Case for Reconceptualizing Empirical Management
and Social Science. Hubbard’s diagnosis of the reproducibility crisis includes a detailed critique of
Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST), in particular testing nil null hypotheses (hypotheses
of “no difference”). His critique is supported by an almost exhaustive reference list, making
Corrupt Research a useful text even if you are very familiar with the issue. Less familiar to
readers may be his discussion of how the widespread tacit acceptance of a philosophically naive
form of Hypothetico-Deductivism (HD) as the Scientific Method permits and exacerbates the
other complementary causes. According to Hubbard, HD is erroneously thought to legitimize the
inappropriate use of NHST and other methodological flaws.
The HD model in question prescribes that scientists first form a hypothesis, in some unspecific
way, then deduce predictions of the hypothesis, and finally test those predictions. In these vague
terms, themodel does describe one important type of scientific reasoning, so if you ignore questions
about the applicability of the HD method to many areas of psychology and how little the model
tells you about the confirmatory value of experimental results, not to mention the scientists such
as Darwin, Skinner, and many others who used very different inferences, HD does possess a
prima facie plausibility. That along with its vague formulation, permits and seems to justify the
use of NHST to apply HD by providing a method for calculating whether a hypothesis has been
disconfirmed.
In turn, NHST’s dominance has given the illusion that all scientific practice fits the HD model.
In Hubbard’s account, NHST and HD together cause a range of problems, such as the widespread
practice of pretending that post-hoc hypothesizing happens a priori. Hubbard tells a compelling
story regarding the proposed connection between HD and NHST, and he cites many corroborating
critics, but his argument consists of circumstantial evidence, as he doesn’t cite any authorities
using HD to explicitly endorse NHST, or vice versa, or provide a survey of literature or textbooks
showing that it is standardly presented as doing so. After his discussion of the beliefs and behaviors
associated with HD his strongest conclusion is, “Given the above beliefs, it is understandable why
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tests of statistical significance have enjoyed such a privileged
status in conventional social and business researchmethodology”
(Hubbard, 2016, p. 38).
The connection between HD and NHST is one part of what
Hubbard calls the Significant Difference approach to science.
Hubbard thinks that the Significant Difference approach to
science is widespread and causes great harm because it promotes
an artificial and misleading view of how science should be
done. This approach presents scientific discoveries as a series of
neat and tidy questions that can be answered with precise and
objective answers with NHST. Hypothesis discovery is neglected
because testing is prioritized under the error that these are very
separate activities. Descriptive correlation analysis is emphasized
over the search for causal explanations. Overgeneralizing is
common within the Significant Difference approach, because
internal validity takes precedence over external validity, and
answers to questions are given based on one data set without
considerations of context. Looking at how NHST is typically
presented by statisticians, Hubbard shows how scientists could be
forgiven for thinking that it provides a conclusive and objective
test of a scientific hypothesis, and hence contributes to the
publication bias toward positive and novel results at the exclusion
of replications. Hubbard provides concerning examples of the
over-reliance on single studies, such as marketing textbooks
teaching that subliminal messaging can increase sales, when this
surprising finding was based on a single 1956 study that lacked
scientific controls.
To the extent that the Significant Difference approach does
consider replication it does does so insufficiently: “A replication
success is defined as a result that was statistically significant in
the initial study and continues to be so (in the same direction)
in the follow up” (Hubbard, 2016, p. 71). But this ignores the
low statistical power of most studies, which Hubbard rightly
labels as “an empirical regularity not to be proud of” (Hubbard,
2016, p. 53). Hubbard presents a table of 16 studies that have
examined the statistical power of articles from social science and
psychology journals. For medium effect sizes there is only about
a 60% chance of rejecting a false null hypothesis. “In short the
significant difference paradigm legislates bad science” (Hubbard,
2016, p. 49).
There are many other reasons to read this book. It covers
related sociological issues, such as the dangers of publish or
perish culture, the evidence that peer review is “inclined to treat
genuinely innovative, risk-taking, research harshly” (Hubbard,
2016, p.238), and the tension between knowledge advancement
and career advancement. Particularly useful is Hubbard’s point-
by-point comparison of Significant Difference with his preferred
approach called Significant Sameness. Hubbard argues that CIs
should replace NHST, because CIs encourage the reader to “think
meta-analytically about estimation, replication, and comparing
intervals across studies” (Hubbard, 2016, p.70). Hubbard claims
that critical realism is a superior philosophical position on the
scientific method than Hypothetico-Deductivism, and following
Haig (2014), calls for wider recognition of other important
elements of scientific reasoning, such as abductive reasoning.
Hubbard carefully details his proposed solution in Corrupt
Research, but one does not have to accept Significant Sameness
to accept the depth and power of this book. Given that many
have called for more philosophy of science training in wake of the
“reproducibility crisis,” Hubbard’s Corrupt Research is a timely
offering.
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